

Review of the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: The Reality in the Context of International Relations*

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Abstract

The first nuclear crisis of 1993-94 on the Korean peninsula culminated not in military confrontation, but rather in diplomatic engagement and the establishment of a series of historical agreements: by the Agreed Framework of October 1994, the U.S. government promised to offer DPRK two light water reactors (LWRs) in place of the graphite reactor in Yongbyon, and more importantly, the full normalization of relations in the near future; in March 1995, the U.S., Japan and South Korea established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Furthermore, North Korea and the U.S. initiated high-level talks on nuclear nonproliferation and normalization. Indeed, the order in Northeast Asia seemed to be on the verge of a peaceful and fundamental reconfiguration. However, yet the promise of rapprochement proved to be only short-lived, and the U.S.-North Korean relations have returned to the state of protracted antagonism that has prevailed since the Korean War. North Korea argues that the only way to resolve the tension on the Korean peninsula is to rebuild their relationship directly with the US. The U.S., however, favors the inclusion of the wider international community in the multilateral approach, to bring about change in the region. The tensions will continue unabated as long as North Korea insists upon its particular logic to solve the regional conflict.

Keywords: Nuclear security, U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, U.S.-Korean Relationships, Nuclear Crisis, DPRK Foreign Policy.

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1. Introduction

Although the international community has been trying to prevent the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) nuclear program, North Korea has openly conducted nuclear tests five times. The latest test, on September 9, 2016, was alleged to have successfully exploded a nuclear warhead. However, we never know the reality in the DPRK's nuclear ability exactly, and nuclear nonproliferation or denuclearization on the Korean peninsula has clearly not been achieved as well.

Indeed, the only superpower after the Cold War, the United States, has not found a way to eliminate the threat of North Korean nuclear and missile attacks. The U.S. and its alliances claim that North Korea's erratic foreign and military policies pose a threat to regional security, and therefore seek an end to DPRK's hostile policies. Meanwhile, DPRK's neighbors have pressured North Korea to open its borders and reform its politico-economic system in an effort to incorporate them into the international community and resolve their economic and social upheaval, similarly, to how China and Russia have transitioned out of the Cold War.

Yet North Korea insists that the only way to resolve the tension on the Korean peninsula is to eliminate the hostile relations that have prevailed between North Korea and the U.S. since the Korean War. From the North Korean perspective, the U.S. must make fundamental compromises, and in the absence of such measures, North Korea maintains its skepticism towards the international community.

Such an impasse has not always been the case; there was once a promising opportunity of rapprochement. The first nuclear crisis of 1993-94 culminated not in military confrontation, but rather in diplomatic engagement and the establishment of a series of historical agreements: by the Agreed Framework of October 1994, the U.S. government promised to offer DPRK two light water reactors (LWRs) in place of the graphite reactor in Yongbyon, and more importantly, the full normalization of relations in the near future; in March 1995 the U.S., Japan and South Korea established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Furthermore, North Korea and the U.S. initiated high-level talks on nuclear nonproliferation and normalization. Indeed, the order in Northeast Asia seemed to be on the verge of a peaceful and fundamental reconfiguration.

Yet the promise of rapprochement proved to be only short-lived, and the US-North Korean relations have returned to the state of protracted antagonism that has prevailed since the Korean War.

North Korea argues that the only way to resolve the tension on the Korean peninsula is to rebuild their relationship directly with the US. The United States, however, favors the inclusion of the wider international community in the multilateral approach of KEDO and the Six-Party talks, to bring about change in the region. The tensions will continue unabated as long as the U.S. and N Korea have different styles of conflict resolution.

Despite the demonstrated benefits of multilateral approaches, divergent approaches to resolving the conflict remain a significant obstacle. For the past three decades, although multilateral efforts have been intertwined with bilateral efforts, the parties involved have never been willing to compromise on their preferred approach at the same time. For this reason, the circumstances in the Korean peninsula might revert to initial hostilities tend to keep on being bad or leading to another war.

This research aims to clarify the reality of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula after the Cold War via theoretical, historical and contextual views of international relations. In this paper, firstly, I try to review the development of nuclear nonproliferation efforts after the Cold War and, secondly, to rethink the first nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. I attempt to understand the reality of the First Nuclear Crisis through the perspective of the U.S. policy of non-proliferation.

2. Nuclear Nonproliferation Initiatives in the early 1990s

2.1. Changing Direction

The international community has managed nuclear nonproliferation regimes via several multilateral treaties and organizations, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee), and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (London Club) (the latter two are informal groups of nuclear export control).

Though not specifically dealing with nuclear nonproliferation, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in April 1987 by the G7 countries, was created in order to control the spread of unmanned delivery systems for nuclear weapons. All these have directly and indirectly contributed to both “Atoms for Peace” and nuclear nonproliferation.

Additionally, the U.S. government has, since the end of the Cold War, regarded the spread of WMDs as a major threat to its national security, and has taken the prevention of WMD proliferation to be one of the major goals of its national security strategy. Therefore, the U.S. has worked to prevent spreading not only nuclear weapons, but also other WMDs through both international and domestic norms and laws.²

The case of Iraq in the early 1990s established a new model for enforcing nonproliferation.³ The case was the first to bring the international community into widespread cooperation to strengthen the global regime of nonproliferation. It served as an opportunity to establish a new direction in nuclear nonproliferation in the post-Cold War world.

Following Iraq's attack on Kuwait, the United States resolved not only to force the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, but also to cooperate among international community to solve Iraq's WMD issue. A series of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions were adopted to resolve the Gulf Crisis: resolution 660 on August 2 condemned the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait, resolution 661 on August 6 sanctioned Iraq, and resolution 662 on August 9th condemned the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq.

²MU Changlin, & PAN Tao. (1998, October 29-November 1). *International Nonproliferation Regimes after the Cold War*, China Institute for International Strategic Studies. Retrieved September 29, 2016, from http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Pan_TaoISODARCO2.pdf

³The previous model of nonproliferation could be found in the South African case. Although the South African government made a commitment to dismantle the program in 1988, the state still possessed several nuclear weapons and had not accessed the NPT yet until they had finally done so for the status of NWS on 19 July 1991. Therefore, its status in the NPT was also still “De Facto NWS” during the Gulf Crisis.

It was resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, which authorized the Gulf War as a means to uphold all previous resolutions.⁴ By this resolution, multinational troops, the majority of which were the U.S. troops, proceeded to attack Iraq in the so-called Operation Desert Storm, with the full-scale air strikes on January 17 1991. The operation was over in about forty days, and President George H. W. Bush declared a victory in the Gulf War on February 28 1992.

During this time, permanent UNSC member China and the Soviet Union never blocked any resolution related to the Gulf Crisis: this could be interpreted to mean that the Cold War was in fact over, and that the U.S. had emerged as the only one super power. Indeed, as the destructive power of American Tomahawk missiles and F-117 Nighthawks, also known as "Stealth Fighters," were broadcast on television during the war, the United States plainly demonstrated its military dominance and prowess to the world.

The Gulf War dramatically altered the situation in Iraq. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq was organized to inspect and eliminate WMD and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km in Iraq by the adoption of UNSC Resolution 687 on April 18 1991.⁵ UNSCOM were able to inspect every single site in Iraq based on the resolution 687, and its inspectors could cover all of Iraq, including any facilities or site, without any restriction.⁶

⁴ Only Cuba and Yemen of the fifteen UNSC members voted against it, and China abstained.

⁵ The UNSCOM could implement the non-nuclear provision of the resolution under the resolution 678, 7-13, and assist the IAEA in the nuclear area as well. Indeed, by an exchange of letters in May 1991 between the Secretary-General of the UN, the executive chairperson of UNSCOM, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, UNSCOM could conduct "Unrestricted freedom of entry and exit" and "Unrestricted freedom of movement" by IAEA in Iraq. Refer to the follow material in detail: United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), Retrieved September 29, 2016, from <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/General/basicfacts.html>

⁶ Black, Stephen. (1991). UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control. *Politics and the Life Sciences*, 18(1). pp. 62-69.

The UNSCOM's inspections of nuclear facilities in Iraq were a dramatic departure from IAEA's previous inspection purview.⁷ Previously, IAEA and countries that ratified the NPT treaty had to acquiesce if inspectors needed to access any unclaimed facilities or sites. With resolution 687, however, inspection by IAEA could now be conducted throughout the entirety of Iraqi national territory.

The inspection purview was seemingly unrelated to the specificities of Iraq's invasion that prompted it in the first place. The UNSCOM initiative prompted talks in the international community toward strengthening IAEA's safeguards. Hans Blix, IAEA Director General from 1981 to 1997, proposed several options to strengthen the safeguards in September 1991, as follows:⁸

1. The inspectors must have access to information from sources besides the state in which the inspections were to be performed;
2. The inspectors must have the right to timely and unrestricted access to any location which, according to credible information, might have an undeclared nuclear installation or contain undeclared nuclear material;
3. The Agency may need to exercise its right under the Agency's Statute and relationship agreement with the United Nations to have access to the Security Council, if the state in question rejects a request for a special inspection.

Had this proposal been realized, IAEA could have accessed any single facility or place with no constraints, whenever they needed more detailed information from the suspicious countries. The power of safeguards would have been allowed to predominate over the states' sovereignty. One of the most significant points was that the IAEA inspectors would be granted access to information from "sources besides the state," which would have had important implications for the North Korean case.⁹

⁷ Mitsuru Kurosawa. (1994). IAEA Nuclear Inspect and UN Security Council. *Kokusai Mondai (International affairs)*, 414, p5 (Japanese).

⁸ Mitsuru Kurosawa. (1995). A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. *Osaka University Law Review*, 42, p23 (Japanese).

⁹ Don Oberdorfer, & Robert Carlin. (2014). *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (revised and updated, third edition)*, New York, Basic Books, p209.

Moreover, in December 1991, Hans Blix suggested both establishing special unit for inspections and effectively using information from member countries or its agencies. At that moment, the international community led by the U.S. pressured North Korea to ratify the NPT, and IAEA attempted to utilize information toward the country. North Korea would be the first target country to which the lesson from Iraq would be adapted while the North Korean government refused such overtures by the IAEA, on the grounds that the agency was strongly linked with the U.S. involvement.¹⁰

In order to strengthen the safeguards system, IAEA members in the General Conference in September 1992 adopted a resolution which noted the “decisions taken by the Board over the preceding 12 months to strengthen the safeguards system” and called on member states to cooperate with the IAEA in implementing those decisions.¹¹ Had this been successfully implemented, the IAEA inspectors could have been able to access any location within suspected countries at any time with members’ cooperation.

2.2. NPT-IAEA Regime

As we have seen above, in the late 1980s and early 1990s there were several cases of nuclear nonproliferation or denuclearization. Each case had different characteristics, and the international community had different attitudes to each country. Despite this diversity of approaches, it was clear that the IAEA and the U.S retained the use force as an option against future “Rogue States” to achieve the goal of nonproliferation or denuclearization.

A practical issue was how to decide which the “Rogue States.” were Despite the NPT’s prohibition of “Horizontal Proliferation” in Article X, the international community and agencies such as IAEA and the UN been unable to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons development.

¹⁰ SIPRI. (1992). *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament*. Stockholm, p96.

¹¹ Arms Control Association. *The IAEA’s State-Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences*. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/Features/The-IAEAs-State-Level-Concept-and-the-Law-of-Unintended-Consequences

There are several categories of nuclear-capable nations outside of NPT: countries as Pakistan, India, and Israel are considered "De facto Nuclear Weapon States," while China and France are "Nuclear Capable States," which have NWS status¹² but had not joined by 1991. Moreover, some countries gained the temporary status of NWS following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the emergence of independent successor states: Ukraine in particular has a huge quantity of nuclear weapons. The U.S. needed Russia to help for non-proliferation on former USSR's members since direct negotiation was no longer possible, and the situation became infinitely more complicated.¹³ The international nuclear nonproliferation system in the early 1990s was still too inefficient and unstable to ensure nuclear security.

On the other hand, "Vertical Proliferation" has remained a problem since the Treaty was first signed. Jozef Goldblat analyzed the risk of Vertical proliferation as follows: "from the beginning of the nuclear age there has been awareness that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries," and the "nuclear-weapon powers are free to assist each other in developing nuclear weapons"¹⁴ so as to possibly neutralize the "duty clause" in the Article I in the NPT.

¹²One of the most efficient methods to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was negotiated during the most 1960s, opened to signature in 1968 and finally entered into force in 1970. Each country will be adjudged as a non-nuclear-weapons state (NNWS) or a nuclear-weapons state (NWS) by the article IX of the NPT. The article indicates that a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967, for this reason, the five UNSC permanent members automatically got the status of NWS. Indeed, the NPT has powerful and forceful mechanism, for instance, the Treaty forces every NNWS to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards (Article III). Although NWS also undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, and others (Article I), there is no any international mechanism or organization to control NWS's undertaking.

¹³The risk of theft, calamity, proliferation by non-government entities or irregular forces or any others was inclining after the Cold War due to the fact that the NPT-IAEA regime does not fit any accident and incident, especially in the former USSR area. Please see more in detail, William Walker. (1992). Nuclear weapons and the former Soviet republics, *International Affairs*, 68 (2), p. 265. Please also refer to the follow, the former Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin (1993). Report on the Bottom-up Review. U.S. DOD, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴Jozef Goldblat. (2002). *Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements*, London, California, and New Delhi, SAGE publications, p. 101. This material fully revised and updated second edition with new CD-ROM documentation supplement, and the first edition published in 1994.

Needless to say, Article I does not mean that NWS must work towards reducing nuclear warheads, nor limit the use of the weapons themselves. As David S. Yost writes, the NPT focuses on nuclear nonproliferation among NNWS, not among NWS.¹⁵ In other words, the Treaty was not designed to control NWS at all. However, the NPT-IAEA regime limitations concrete the status between NNWS and NWS as Yukio Yokohara pointed out. Indeed, Yukio adds that the regime has been affected by the “Atomic for Peace” program, being a black market, and insufficient securing for NNWS security to spread the skills relevant to nuclear weapons.¹⁶ In particular, no mechanism for NNWS security, thus some that attempts to become NWS states

Furthermore, one of the weakest points in the NPT is in the section of Article X that indicates: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” The international community did not anticipate this clause actually being invoked, but that is precisely what happened two years before it was decided to extend the Treaty perpetually. North Korea announced to withdrawal from the Treaty in March 1993, and the only state to really withdraw from it in January 2003. This threatening marked the beginning of the First Nuclear Crisis on the Korean peninsula.

Indeed, the NPT stipulates that a review conference is to be held every five years (Article VIII), and 25 years after the enforcement of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods (Article X). However, the review conference has moved adopt the final document among members only five times out of the nine total review conferences since the NPT took effect in 1970.

¹⁵ David S. Yost. (2007). Analysing International Nuclear Order. *International Affairs*, 83 (3), p. 560.

¹⁶ Yukio Yokohara. (2005). *Towards the NPT Review Conference: What to do for the abolition of nuclear weapons*. Unpublished. Hiroshima Peace Institute, Rethink NPT Regime: Proposal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, p. 2 (Japanese).

There were several controversial issues in the review meetings: for example, NNWS claimed that the safeguards provided for in Article III placed them at a disadvantage in comparison with States that were not parties, and one of the most intense debates was again on the implementation of Article VI, insofar as the Article "most participants held that the NWS had not adequately fulfilled their obligations to negotiate effective measures to halt the nuclear-arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament."¹⁷

Although there were still discrepancies among members during the past the extension conferences, both NWS and NNWS ultimately reached an agreement to indefinitely extend the NPT. The limited effectiveness of the Treaty is also apparent insofar as India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan never signed the Treaty, and as mentioned above, North Korea has withdrawn from it.

2.3. Reducing, but still a Vast Amount Remains

During the Cold War, a vast amount of nuclear warheads was produced in the United States and the Soviet Union, so in case of any conflicts or nuclear wars each side could destroy the other's cities and society, so-called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), even though the idea was an object of ridicule. Thus, discussions on the restriction of strategic nuclear missiles were first prompted by the experience the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. According to Commander Robert D. Green's argument, the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on October 19 in 1962 learned that the Soviet strategic missiles and nine nuclear warheads in Cuba had been already deployed.¹⁸ The Cuban Missile Crisis between the US and USSR brought the two superpowers to the edge of nuclear war, and both realized that nuclear deterrence may not be functioning as intended.

¹⁷ Reaching Critical Will. (n.d.). Retrieved September 30, 2016, from <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/history-of-the-npt-1975-1995>

¹⁸ Robert D. Green. (2010). *Security without Nuclear Deterrence*. New Zealand, Astron Media, pp. 90-91.

The crisis prompted both Kennedy and Khrushchev to seek accelerated rapprochement over the restriction of nuclear explosions. Negotiations initially focused on a comprehensive ban, but this was abandoned due to technical questions surrounding the detection of underground tests and the Soviet Union concerns over the intrusiveness of the proposed verification methods. One of the multilateral non-proliferation treaty, "Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water," which prohibited all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground. The Partial Test Ban Treaty, PTBT, was signed by the governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States in Moscow on 5 August 1963, and subsequently opened for signature by other countries. The Treaty formally went into effect on October 10, 1963.

In the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. and the USSR pursued a series of diplomatic solutions to reducing the nuclear arms race. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) between the countries began in November 1969 and the two powers subsequently agreed to pursue a follow-up treaty in November 1972 (SALT II). The U.S. government proposed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in the early 1980s, and START II was discussed in the early 1990s. On the other hand, the development of nuclear weapons technology continued through this period. For example, the U.S. and USSR implemented the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) in the early 1970s.¹⁹ Indeed, nuclear weapons stockpiles had increased since the first test by the U.S. in 1945, to a volume of over 60,000 in the 1980s. Though this number has since decreased, the US retained around 10,000 warheads as recently as 2013.²⁰

A significant movement toward denuclearization in particular emerged by the time the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, both sides had achieved significant reduction of nuclear armaments. For example, after protracted debate, the U.S. and the Soviet closed a deal to accept the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in December 1987.

¹⁹ Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, & Milton M. Hoenig. (1984-1994). *Nuclear Weapons Databook: Vol. 1-5*. New York, Natural Resources Defense Council, pp. 6-7.

²⁰ Hans M. Kristensen, & Robert S. Norris. (2013). Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013. *Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists*, 69, pp. 75-81.

During the George Bush administration, the two superpowers worked more closely than ever before together toward reducing nuclear warheads and resolving military tension. In September 1991, President George Bush announced that the U.S. would remove almost all the U.S. tactical nuclear forces from deployment as an impetus for Russia to undertake similar actions. In October 1991, "Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded to Bush's speech with reciprocal Soviet measures" to "eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear mines." Gorbachev also pledged to withdraw all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons from deployment.²¹

Washington has taken an initiative forward reduction of nuclear weapons competition after the Cold War.²² All these efforts aimed to focus on nuclear arms control with the aim of preventing nuclear war and the competition for nuclear weapons among NWS, but such developments greatly influenced the situation on the Korean peninsula.

When the US confronted the North Korean case, they faced the decision of whether to use military force in implementing the non-proliferation policy. The Iraqi case demonstrated the Bush administration's willingness to use force, but several other cases, such as India, Israel, and Pakistan, demonstrate that force was by no means the only option.

3. New Waves on the Korean Peninsula

3.1. Nuclear Nonproliferation Initiatives on the Korean Peninsula

In the 1980s, the analysis of satellite pictures led the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to suspect that the DPRK's nuclear program was covertly producing weapons. The US government did not take immediate action: the extent of nuclear weapons development was uncertain, but they kept observing the overall situation of DPRK's nuclear programs and its facilities.

²¹ Arms Control Association. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PINs) on Tactical Nuclear Weapons as a Glance. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from <https://www.armscontrol.org/print/111>

²² Arms Control Association. U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreementsMarch2010>

Focus on North Korea was primarily as the country related to the USSR's policy since the 1950s of assisting its satellites, and DPRK in particular, with nuclear development.²³ In fact, the USSR and DPRK were talking about cooperation of four LWRs before Gorbachev took the leadership.

Given the climate of greater cooperation between the US and the USSR, the U.S. government was willing to rely on the USSR to pressure the DPRK to join the NPT and accept the safeguards for nuclear inspections. This took the form of Gorbachev persuading North Korea to join the NPT in exchange for the Soviet construction of four Light Water Reactors (LWRs) in North Korea.

Pyongyang finally agreed to sign the NPT as a NNWS in December 1985. After signing the NPT, however, relations between DPRK and the USSR deteriorated with Gorbachev's drive for domestic and foreign policy reforms and initiatives to open the country. Under Article III, Paragraph IV in the NPT, North Korea was obliged to accept the safeguards by June 1987, regardless of the lack of progress in constructing the four LWRs. The deadline to join the safeguard had come, but was suspended by more than eighteen months due to an error in sending of IAEA documents.²⁴

Although there were still suspicions of North Korea, the international community had yet to acquire definitive evidence against it. According to the *Asahi Shimbun* on November 19, 1989, "In northern Pyongyang, the Japanese government had information that a facility under construction might be a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, but it was not certain. Thus, North Korea would better to accept the inspections if the facility was not relevant to a nuclear weapon program." Indeed, it was reported that Hiroshi Ota, Director-General of the Scientific and Technological Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, said the following in an article of the *AERA* on October 8, 1991: "As North Korean Leader Kim Il-sung mentioned, they had really no intention to develop nuclear weapons, just to accept the inspections." Information about the movement of North Korea's nuclear development had been reported by variety of sources from outside North Korea.

²³ Im Hyo-bin et al. (1997). *Study on Assessment of the North Korean Energy System Technology*. Institute for Advanced Engineering, pp.28-43 (Korean).

²⁴ Don Oberdorfer, & Robert Carlin. (2013). op. cit., p. 198.

Meanwhile, in the late 1980's, Pyongyang repeatedly declared its commitment to denuclearization and to the construction of a nuclear free zone on the Korean Peninsula, and simultaneously insisted upon the "Multilateral Talks" which they had in fact rejected several times before. According to the Rodong Sinmun on June 19, 1986, North Korea proposed high-level talks on military and security issues among the U.S., South and North Korea. North Korea's public stance toward both nonproliferation and foreign policy were strongly affected by the U.S. and the USSR, while maintaining a nuclear development strategy.

The North Korean government maintained that there was the only way to solve the issue of denuclearization in the Korean peninsula: working directly with the U.S. At an international conference in Pyongyang in October 1988, Kim Il-sung declared: "The United States has no reason to install a huge invasion armed in South Korea... furthermore; the U.S. has no justifications for bringing nuclear warheads to South Korea against our republic as a non-NWS."²⁵

In addition, through the statements of the Foreign Ministry in November 1990, North Korea insisted that they could sign the safeguards only if the U.S. provided the state a legal guarantee of no nuclear threat²⁶ the nuclear nonproliferation issue in the Korean peninsula was steadily emerging, and anticipation of intergovernmental talks with North Korea was simultaneously growing as well.

3.2. Distinctive Period: 1991-1992

In a June 1991 interview with Kyodo News Service, Kim Il-sung stated, "We have no nuclear weapons, and we will not produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, we do not oppose the nuclear inspection. Now in South Korea... around one thousand U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed. So the nuclear inspection should be forced upon both the North and the South."²⁷ North Korea indicated clearly that they did not have any nuclear weapons, or the intention to produce any, in accepting the IAEA's inspection. The U.S. had to respond with further steps to improve the situation.

²⁵ The Korean Central News Agency. (1989). *Korea Central Yearbook 1989*.Pyongyang, p. 57 (Korean).

²⁶ Korean Affairs Institute. (1991). *The Monthly Korean Affairs*, 356, pp. 2-3 (Japanese).

²⁷ The Korean Central News Agency. (1992). *Korea Central Yearbook 1992*. Pyongyang, p. 44 (Korean).

In September 1991, President George Bush announced the US government's plan to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia, as discussed earlier in this paper, and this included nuclear weapons in South Korea. Although U.S. responded North Korea's expect, the response certainly targeted not only North Korea but also the world, especially on the USSR. With the end of the Cold War, the movement for nonproliferation spread worldwide.

Furthermore, President Roh Tae-woo in November 1991 declared the "Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives," that South Korea would not "manufacture, process, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," and the background was told "both U.S. and the Soviet Union are in the process of reducing and dismantling nuclear weapons on a large scale."²⁸ This declaration officially confirmed that the South would follow the U.S. nonproliferation policy.

It was yet unclear whether or not North Korea would immediately accept the IAEA inspections, insofar as they had insisted that the cross-inspection by U.S. was based on the acceptance for the inspections. Indeed, there were no convictions to improve the relations between U.S. and DPRK since the nonproliferation maneuver was going well as North Korea's require.

However, new nonproliferation maneuver in the Korean peninsula could move surely forward if countries had cooperated well for reducing the tense and stabilizing the situation. In fact, in December 1991, North and South Korean governments agreed upon the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" between north and south, which was officially signed and came into effect the following February.

²⁸ Federation of American Scientists. (1991, November 8). *President Roh Tae Woo's Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives*. Retrieved September 28, 2016, from <http://fas.org/news/skorea/1991/911108-d4111.htm>

In addition, the "Agreement on reconciliation and non-aggression with exchanges and cooperation between the North and South" with the joint declaration also came into force.²⁹ According to Asahi Shimbun on January 7, 1992, the South Korean government officially announced the discontinuation of the US-ROK joint military exercise "Team Spirit": this was a significant step towards rapprochement, as these exercises were the focal point of North Korea's accusations of US-South Korean cooperation in nuclear war preparations, and the North had repeatedly demanded the cessation of these exercise over the years.

The sustained demonstration of US goodwill to North Korea and promises of genuine nonproliferation on the peninsula finally convinced the North Korean government to sign the safeguards and accepting the inspections on January 30, 1992. More than five years had passed since the government signed the NPT.

This short period from late 1991 through the first half of 1992 contained the most important factors in predicting the Korean Peninsula in the future. Don Oberdorfer discusses how the "winter of 1991 inaugurated a period of unusual progress in North-South relations and in North Korea's relations with the United States," and describes this time as "rare period when the policies of the two Korea were in alignment for conciliation and agreement, with the entire major outside powers either neutral or supportive."³⁰

3.3. Japan and North Korea

The immense global transformations brought about by the end of the Cold War had a strong effect on the tensions on the Korean peninsula. The new and huge waves with the end of the Cold War had widely swiped in the world, and the energy toward the Korean peninsula was obviously strong to change the tense when North Korea had just started playing the nuclear card to survive its regime in the late 1980s.³¹

²⁹ Ministry of Unification. (2004). *The South and North Korean Governments Meeting*. Seoul, Ministry of Unification, pp. 44-49 (Korean).

³⁰ Don Oberdorfer, & Robert Carlin. (2013). *op. cit.*, p. 203.

³¹ Yur-Bok Lee, & Wayne Patterson. (eds.). (1998). *Korean-American relations, 1866-1997*. New York, the State University of New York Press, p. 125.

However, while the international community remained skeptical about the North's nuclear program, there was increased confidence in a new era for rebuilding peaceful relations not only within the Korean Peninsula, but also in the Northeast Asian region more broadly.

North Korea was prompted to strengthen ties with its neighbors, specifically Japan, by South Korea's new "Northern Policy": the South Korean government under Roh Tae-woo took advantage of the collapse of Cold War alliances to strengthen ties with the traditional allies of North Korea, with the ultimate goal of normalizing relations with communist countries, especially China and the Soviet Union. The goal was to isolate North Korea to the point that the country would finally open itself to the international community. The South successfully normalized relations with Hungary in 1989, the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992. North Korea suddenly found itself in need of a new strategy for survival.

In September 1990, a Japanese political delegation led by former deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru of the Liberal Democratic Party visited North Korea. Following private meetings between Kanemaru and Kim Il-sung, a joint declaration was released on September 28 calling for Japan to apologize compensate North Korea for its 1910-1945 of colonial rule. In addition, Japan and North Korea agreed to begin talks aimed at the establishment of diplomatic relations.

In January 1991, Japan began normalization talks with Pyongyang with a formal apology for its period of colonial rule. The negotiations were aided by Tokyo's support for a proposal for the simultaneous entry into the United Nations of both North Korea and South Korea. However, the issue of the inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities and the exact amount of Japanese compensations proved more difficult to negotiate. Making matters worse, the Japanese government's response to the Northern argument on these issues was to shift the focus to North Korea's hostile activities and Japanese abductions issue.³² The confidence and energy of the normalization talks quickly began to disintegrate.

³² Jung Ho Bae, & Sung Chull Kim. (2009). Japan's North Korea Policy: The Dilemma of Coercion. Sung Chull Kim, & David C Kang. (eds.). *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*(pp. 73-76). New York, the State University of New York Press.

Table one Normalization Talks between Japan and North Korea in the 1990s³³

Round	Time	Place	Main issues
First	1991.1.30-31	Pyongyang	Compensation or the right to claim damages during Japanese colonial rule , Accepting the nuclear inspections
Second	1991.3.11-12	Tokyo	Colonial rule, Effective control, Nuclear inspections
Third	1991.5.20-22	Beijing	Effective control, Nuclear inspections, the case of Lee Eunhae
Fourth	1991.8.30-9.2	Beijing	Effective Control, Compensation or the right to claim, the case of Lee Eunhae
Fifth	1991.11.18-20	Beijing	Compensation, Japanese women who had gone to the North with her Korean husbands ³⁴
Sixth	1992.1.30-31	Beijing	Annexation, Nuclear inspections
Seventh	1992.5.13-15	Beijing	Annexation, Nuclear inspections
Eighth	1992.11.5	Beijing	The case of Lee Eunhae

Moreover, the emergence of the issue of Lee Eunhae complicated the already fragile cooperation between North Korea and Japan, insofar as it was strongly evoked the highly sensitive matter of Japanese abduction.³⁵

The North Korean Government denied the slightest suspicions, out of concern for the effects that the issue of abduction might have on their normalization talks. Japan-North Korea talks seemed to be surrounded by the abduction issue even though North Korea was willing to move the talks on economic issues. After the eighth round of negotiations in November 1992, the bilateral talks were postponed, and would not be resumed for another decade.

³³ For more detailed information, please refer to the following materials, Cho Tong-ho at al. (eds.). (2002). *A study on the economic development strategy of North Korea*. Seoul, Korea Development Institute, pp.176-180 (Korean). Lee Jong Won et al. (eds.). (2003). *Japan-North Korea Negotiations: Tasks and Prospects*. Tokyo, Iwanami, pp.231-246 (Japanese).

³⁴The Japan Times. (2003, February 13). *Helping 'refugees' from the North*. Retrieved September 28, 2016, from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2003/02/13/editorials/helping-refugees-from-the-north/>

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2002, April). *Outline and Background of Abduction Cases of Japanese Nationals by North Korea*. Retrieved September 28, 2016, from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/abduct.html

4. War Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

4.1. The Beginning

As we examined above, the tension on the Korean peninsula had been lessening in the 1991-1992 period, while the reality of new post-Cold War order had forced them to accept the IAEA inspections. Despite a spirit of multilateral cooperation among relevant nations to alleviate the tension in the region, the U.S. and its allies South Korea and Japan still doubted North Korea's true willingness to accept the inspections.

Nevertheless, the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly ultimately ratified the Safeguards Agreement in April 1992, and the government submitted its initial reports to the IAE under its Safeguards Agreement in May 1992. The initial reports extended to 150 pages, and included the current state of nuclear facilities and nuclear development to be subjected to inspection. IAEA would perform the inspections based on the contents of this report. The IAEA and the U.S. focused specifically on the Yongbyon facilities described in the report, since one of them was suspiciously reprocessing facility.³⁶ From May 11 to 16 in 1992, Hans Blix, the Director General of the IAEA, visited North Korea to discuss the upcoming inspections with government officials. Since IAEA's aim was to strengthen the power of inspections with U.S. cooperation, upcoming inspections would get much serious using the lesson from the Iraqi case.

The first IAEA inspections team, led by Chief inspector Willi Theis, visited North Korea from May 25 to June 7 1992. Just after the first inspections, it was reported on June 15 by Reuters that the IAEA spokesman, David Kyd, said nuclear facilities in Yongbyon were "30 years old." The evaluation could be interpreted to mean that the North's limited technology made it impossible to create nuclear weapons, and that the CIA's prediction that North Korea would be able to produce one or two nuclear weapons in the very near future might have been unfounded.

³⁶ The U.S. government in the late 1980s noticed that North Korea might process the nuclear waste since its satellites discover the North's "tests with conventional explosions of the kind needed to design a nuclear warhead" at Yongbyon. Don Oberdorfer, & Robert Carlin. (2013). op. cit., pp.194-196. Please also refer to the follow, Walter C. Clemens Jr. (eds.). *North Korea and the World: Human Rights, Arms Control, and Strategies for Negotiations*, chapter 6.

However, following the second inspection on July 6th 1992, conflict between the IAEA and the North Korean government began to emerge. IAEA targeted the radiochemical laboratory in Yongbyon as the suspicious reprocessing facility. The Agency doubted that North Korea reprocessed plutonium at that laboratory, and therefore requested access to two additional facilities, which North Korea insisted they were military facilities. IAEA explained that they found "inconsistencies emerged between the DPRK's initial declaration and the Agency's findings... suggested that there existed in the DPRK undeclared plutonium."³⁷

North Korea rejected the requirement under the Information Circular/403 (INFCIRC/403) that the agreement on January 30 in 1992 between IAEA and DPRK was reproduced for the information of all IAEA members.³⁸ According to Article 73 of the INFCIRC/403, IAEA could make special inspections in order to verify the information contained in special reports. On the other hand, the DPRK has the right to request that any question arising out of the inspections or application of the Agreement (Article 21), and most significantly, that North Korea could assert their right to refuse IAEA's request for special inspections as well.

There were two options to verify whether North Korea's additional facilities were involved in a secret nuclear program: either reaching a new agreement to conduct special inspections, or to utilize force, as in the Iraqi case. IAEA was committed to accessing any suspicious facilities at all costs, and thus supported military intervention. However, Kurosawa was opposed: "In the case of Iraq, since it was implemented as part of the mandatory sanctions of the United Nations, the inspectors unlimited right to access any location was observed. However, North Korea's case is an inspection based on the safeguards agreement."³⁹ In other words, as for the case of North Korea, it is neither in the invasion of other countries, such as Iraq, serving as reliable evidence was nothing.

³⁷ IAEA. *Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards*. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>

³⁸ IAEA. *Information Circular/403*. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc403.pdf>

³⁹ Mitsuru Kurosawa. (1994). *op. cit.*, p. 12.

No matter how suspicious the facilities, the inspections must proceed through negotiations with North Korea, in accordance with international rules. Mitsuo Okamoto asserted, "Non-NWS who signed the NPT must get the right to "Atomic for Peace" exchange obligations of acceptance the safeguards. There is nothing when the relationships between non-NWS and U.S. has not any problems, but the inspections by IAEA under the U.S. pressure are likely to force the target countries such as Iraq or North Korea when countries have critical toward U.S."⁴⁰ While the cause of denuclearization would undoubtedly be advanced by the inspections, the risk of exacerbating conflict through compulsory inspection was argued to be too great.

Meanwhile, one the most pressing and precarious issues was emerging that the Team Spirit exercise might be restarting in 1994. The U.S. and South Korean governments in October 1993 stated that they may prepare to resume the exercise due to suspicions of North Korea's unabated nuclear development. On November 4, 1993, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with an announcement that they would not accept any inspections as long as the exercise continued.

North Korea "interpreted the compromise as a quid pro quo deal that set the modalities of all further development" that North Korea would only accept the IAEA inspections "in exchange for permanent U.S. cancelation of the Team Spirit exercises and removal of its nuclear threat to the DPRK."⁴¹ IAEA repeatedly demanded access to unlisted facilities suspected of being nuclear facilities; on the other hand, DPRK were holding out on acceptance of the inspections, while simultaneously insisting on the termination of the Team Spirit exercises.

4.2. The Clinton Administration Initiative

The situation in the Korean peninsula changed dramatically after the Clinton administration was inaugurated in January 1993. The DPRK had threatened to terminate its support for inspections unless the U.S. would decide to conduct the U.S.-South Korea military exercise.

⁴⁰ Mitsuo Okamoto. (2005). *If you want peace, prepare for peace!* HoritsuBunkaSha, p. 12 (Japanese).

⁴¹ Young Whan Kihl, & Peter Hayes.(eds.). (1997). *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula*, Armonk, New York, London, England, East Gate Book, p. 231.

While the situation was steadily getting gloomy, the Clinton administration refused on the grounds that they were officials of the Korean Workers Party or members of the supreme People's Assembly.⁴² Indeed, following the sixth inspection of January 26 to February 6, 1993, the Agency concluded that there were significant discrepancies between the results gathered and the amount of plutonium on the North's initial reports.

After the IAEA circulated pictures of the suspicious Yongbyon facilities taken by the U.S. on February 22, 1993, the Board required North Korea to accept its access to all facilities in question within one month. Since North Korea issues no response, the Agency concluded a decision for North Korea to bring the issue to the UNSC on February 25. Furthermore, the Clinton administration clarified its stance on reopening the Team Spirit exercise, further exacerbating the situation.

On March 13, 1993, North Korea sent a letter which included its withdrawal from the NPT, prompting the international community focus on how to undo North Korea's statement. In particular, the Clinton administration considered the most efficient methods for solving the situation, but there would not be certain options to deal with the North's nuclear problem without North Korea's cooperation ironically.

Former Hanyang University Professor Lee Young-hee emphasized, "North Korea was forced into a crisis of national survival after the Cold War, and in such circumstances they tried to break through with a nuclear issue of military conflict with the U.S.", therefore, "the North's acts bought America's anger to rule the global nuclear order as the only superpower."⁴³ Under such circumstances, the nuclear crisis spread and a long bargain over the resolution of the crisis was implemented.

The Clinton administration had to choose between a forceful intervention and peaceful engagement. "Mr. Clinton's top priority was avoiding use of military force and confrontation, even if that meant accepting significant risks to U.S. interests."⁴⁴

⁴² Yur-Bok Lee, & Wayne Patterson (eds.). (1998). op. cit. p. 128.

⁴³ Lee Young-hee. (2000). *New Millennium in the Korean Peninsula*, Tokyo, ShakaiHyoronSha, p.130 (Japanese).

⁴⁴ Robert Manning, & Patrick Clawson. (1997, December 29). *The Clinton Doctrine*. Retrieved September 20, 2016, from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-clinton-doctrine>

However, the Clinton administration had considered several coercive options for North Korea, including strengthening sanctions and a so-called "surgical operation" to eliminate nuclear facilities in Yongbyon through military action.

In this point, it was unclear exactly how much nuclear weapons-grade plutonium North Korea actually had. The most accepted estimate was that North Korea had a total of 6 to 13 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for "one and perhaps two nuclear weapons."⁴⁵ This meant that the U.S. had to deal with the possibility of North Korea having two plutonium weapons at most.

Through this stage of the crisis, North Korea insisted on negotiations with U.S. as the mode of resolving the conflict. According to the *Rodong Sinmun* on March 13 1993, North Korea stressed that "U.S. will put the label of a breach of special inspections and bring the issue to discuss at the UNSC to impose collective sanctions if we keep denying the special inspections to our military bases." This condemnation underscored that the root of the conflict was U.S. influence, and that conversely, the only viable resolution was through direct negotiations with the U.S.⁴⁶

At that moment, North Korea's economy was on the downturn and the normalization talks with Japan likewise deteriorating, all while it found itself increasingly isolated from the international community. Therefore, North Korea sought to escape from nuclear weapons crisis through the withdrawal from NPT.⁴⁷ Otherwise, the country might be lured to the crisis of nuclear proliferation to U.S. he situation of the crisis of nuclear proliferation either carrot or stick.

⁴⁵ David Albright. (1994). North Korean Plutonium Production. *Science & Global Security*, 5, p. 83.

⁴⁶ Hiroyuki Taniguchi pointed out that the U.S. as one of nuclear superpowers in the world had a desire to confine North Korea in the frame of the NPT. Therefore, North Korea tried to draw conditions of the negotiations from the U.S. using North Korea suspected developing a secret nuclear program. Hiroyuki Taniguchi. (1998). *An Introduction to the Contemporary International Relations*, Toyo, KoyoShobo, p. 420 (Japanese).

⁴⁷ Masao Okonogi in the *Asahi Shimbun*, March 13, 1993, asserted that North Korea was "promoting nuclear development in a secret way and simultaneously trying to rebuild the economy via improving relations with the United States and Japan. This policy would not have been changed from the past while the situation has been difficult. For this reason, they determined to withdraw from the NPT even though isolation was unavoidable."

The Clinton administration was committed to the indefinite extension of the NPT, and thus sought for as many countries as possible to attend the 1993 preparatory meeting for the NPT extension (scheduled for 1995) and vote in favor.⁴⁸ The U.S. sought to maintain and strengthen the NPT-IAEA regime and avoid North Korea's withdrawal declaration becoming a precedent for our other nations; therefore, they had to carefully deal with the North Korean case.

4.3. Alternative Option: Missiles

Relying on pressure by the UNSC was a problematic strategy. Collective sanctions by the UN on North Korea were only possible if the UN permanent members including Russia and China agreed. However, the two countries were unlikely to cooperate with the sanctions if they would lead to destabilization of the regional situation. In particular, China's policy was to ensure stability along its borders as an essential component of its own economic growth. As such, it could not be counted on to support any measure that could lead to military conflict. For this reason, China abstained from the UNSC resolution 825 against North Korea on May 11 in 1993. The resolution 825 as follows was adopted by 13 of the 15 UNSC members with China and Pakistan abstaining.

⁴⁸ At the time, the United States strongly supported the indefinite extension of the NPT, however many countries in the Middle East or Africa had claimed a conditional extension. Although the indefinite extension might pass with a majority of the NPT treaty countries, many numbers of countries did not express aggressively supporting the U.S. policy. Please refer to the follow, Lee Jong-sun. (1995, May). *Conflict and the future development over the NPT regime*. Seoul, National Assembly Library of the Republic of Korea: International Issues Analysis, 12 (Korean).

1. Calls upon: the DPRK to reconsider the announcement contained in the letter of 12 March 1993 and thus to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty
2. Further calls upon: the DPRK to honour its non-proliferation obligation under the Treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA as a specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 25 February 1993
3. Requests: the Director-General of the IAEA to continue to consult with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues which are the subject of the Board of Governors' findings and to report to the Security Council on his efforts in due time
4. Urges: all member states to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to this resolution, and encourage them to facilities a solution
5. Decides: to remain seized of the matter and to consider further Security Council action if necessary.⁴⁹

The language of Resolution 825 was ambiguous, especially in its call for all members to "encourage" North Korea to resolve the issue. This term had an important meaning for improving the situation. For the Clinton administration, this phrase could be utilized as the basis for dialogue with North Korea. Shunji Hiraiwa pointed out that "in response to the adoption of this draft resolution 825, the Clinton administration ultimately had to embark on negotiations with North Korea on the nuclear issue."⁵⁰ As a result, immediately following Resolution 825, the Clinton administration made arrangements for high-level talks with North Korea. According to the New York Times on May 18 in 1993, the U.S. and North Korea had opened a meeting for high-level talks held on May 17. In these talks, the Clinton administration (scheduled in June) focused only the nuclear issue, ignoring questions of improving relations or any of North Korea's requests. The IAEA ultimately declared that North Korea was not adhering to its safeguards agreement and that it could not guarantee that North Korean nuclear material was not being diverted for military uses.⁵¹

⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council.(n.d.). Retrieved Septemebr 20, 2016, from <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/280/49/IMG/N9328049.pdf?OpenElement>

⁵⁰ Shunji Hiraiwa. (1997). Tradition Regression in isolation. Masao Okonogi. (ed.). *North Korea Handbook*(p. 396). Tokyo, Kodansha.

⁵¹ Arms Controls Association. (n.d.). Retrieved September 20, 2016, from <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>

On May 29, 1993, North Korea launched Rodong1 to the east sea of Korea, which "is reported to have a range of about 600 miles, enough to reach Osaka, Japan's second largest metropolitan area and a major manufacturing center while officials said it went only about 300 miles. On the other hand, according to some reports, North Korea also shot off two other missiles, believed to be versions of the Scud."⁵²

The Rodong1 launching revealed the defenselessness of neighboring countries to missile attacks from North Korea. In particular, the U.S. forces in Korea and Japan had been placed in serious threat since U.S. must take into intervention to Korea, Japan, and the entire region. Moreover, since North Korea had been exporting missiles and related technology to so-called "Rogue States,"⁵³ the U.S. was even more concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton administration was launched soon that was also forced to correspond to the proliferation of missiles as well as nuclear.

The missile launch destroyed any of the Clinton administration's remaining hope for a partial intervention, and led the U.S. to choose a path of wide-ranging and direct involvement. On June 2 in 1993, high-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea began. The issues dealt with were included not only the nuclear problem, but also the circumstances in the Korean peninsula. The two sides compromised on some issues and reached an agreement twice on June 11 and July 19, and the July agreement became the Agreed Framework in October 1994.⁵⁴

⁵² David E. Sanger. (1993, June 13). *Missile is tested by North Koreans*. Retrieved September 20, 2016, from <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/13/world/missile-is-tested-by-north-koreans.html>

⁵³ According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, the main export countries of North Korea's weapons including missiles were Iran, Syria, and Libya during the past decades. For this reason, the U.S. had to try preventing that North Korea would export missiles or its technology to these "non-cooperative" countries for the United States.

⁵⁴ The U.S. and North Korea talked critical issues included to switch from North Korea's "graphite-moderated to light-water reactors" and "to hold discussions with the IEA and re-engage with the South. Please refer to the follow, John Merrill. (1994). North Korea in 1993: In the Eye of the Storm. *Asian Survey*, 34 (1), pp. 10-11.

5. The Essence of the Agreement Framework

5.1. The Carter Initiative

Following the July agreement, the U.S.-North Korea talks showed no progress at all, while demands for the nuclear inspections by the U.S. and IAEA intensified. Since the beginning of 1994, the U.S. continued to request the acceptance of special inspections by the IAEA, but North Korea had also continued to deny it. For North Korea, it was thought of as the core issue of the negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear issue, and thus did not readily accept IAEA's request. Not only the U.S. but also its allies were working to strengthen the pressure on North Korea. The Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in February announced that Japan should correspondingly take the relevant action when the UNSC decided upon sanctions on North Korea. At this moment, the Japanese government was maneuvering to become a permanent member of the UNSC, thus Japan might be considered strongly cooperate with the U.S.

In the working-level talks between the North and South, the tension and conflict was also worsening. The foul mood in negotiations was further exacerbated by the comments of a North Korean official, who on March 19th referred to Seoul as "a sea of fire." In fact, the remark had been reported out of context, and the original comment stated that Seoul could potentially become "a sea of fire" if the event of the U.S. attack on the North.⁵⁵ Regardless, the comment deepened mistrust from the South.

Despite the North's intentions and efforts, sanctions against them were being further strengthened. According to the Asahi Shimbun on March 23 and 27 in 1994, for example, the Japanese government announced that it was considering its own sanctions, such as alternating current limit, remittance stop, and naval blockade on the assumption North Korea with the premise that the UNSC resolutions. Moreover, the South Korean government also announced that they arranged the Team Spirit exercises and were installing Patriot missiles from the U.S.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Kevin Magill, Diana Pritchard, Chris Rhodes, & Hazel Smith.(eds.). (1996). *North Korea in the New World Order*. London, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 45.

⁵⁶ It was reported that Lee Byong-dea Korea Minister of Defense and William Perry U.S. Secretary of Defense on April 20 agreed the Team Spirit exercise would resume in November

North Korea corresponds to the pressure by international community escalated into conflicts; they decided to take out the nuclear fuel spent rods from 5-megawatt graphite in Yongbyon on April 27 in 1994 and notified the IAEA. Possibly, they could develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, they already began working to take out of the fuel rods on May 14 before the IAEA inspectors were scheduled to arrive. The IAEA reported this development to the UNSC, and the UNSC subsequently adopted a presidential statement urging the future of measurement possible preservation of the spent nuclear fuel rods on May 30. Furthermore, on June 10 the IAEA adopted a sanctions proposal suspending technical assistance to North Korea, amounting to \$ 560,000 annually. North Korea declared its withdrawal from the IAEA on June 13. The Clinton administration was faced with the question of whether or not to increase the military forces in South Korea to respond the North's actions. On June 15, the South Korean government exercised the evacuation training through the country. There was an increasing tension on the Korean peninsula.

**Table two A Drafts of the Gradual Sanctions against North Korea by U.S.
(Excerpt)⁵⁷**

Stage	Sanctions
First	Prohibition nuclear-related technology and scientific support. Prohibition aircraft fly in principle. Prohibition economic cooperation and arms embargo. ⁵⁸ ※ The first stage sanctions will be run within 30 days after the resolution adopted.
Second	Freezing assets and Prohibition remittance. ⁵⁹
Third	Decides to undergo further action if necessary.

if North Korea continued to reject the inspections by the IAEA. However, patriot missiles were only implemented in South Korea. Please refer to the following newspapers, the Donga Ilbo on April 21, 1994 (Korean), the Asahi Shimbun on October 21, 1994 (Japanese).

⁵⁷Jiji Press.(1994, July). *World Affairs Weekly*.pp. 63-67 (Japanese).

⁵⁸ Comprehensive economic sanctions against North Korea by the U.S. Began since the Korean War, and North Korea have endured for more than half a century under the conditions. Therefore, there was no clear assurance about the efficacy of the further sanctions.

⁵⁹ According to the analysis of Larry A. Niksch, it was impossible to pose economic sanctions, especially in trade and remittance without cooperation with Russia, China, and Japan. Please refer to the follow, Larry A. Niksch. (1994). "U.N. Security Council consideration of North Korea's Violations of its NuclearTreaty Obligations," Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, April 6, 1994.

While the Clinton administration was considering whether or not to expand military presence in South Korea, the former President Jimmy Carter conducted a meeting with Kim Il-sung via an unofficial "Private Trip."⁶⁰ After visiting, he walked across the Demilitarized Zone to Joint Security Area, the so-called "Panmunjom," in South Korea, on June 15. Just after arriving at Panmunjom, Carter in an interview with the CNN live said that he had met Kim Il-sung twice, and they agreed upon some key points, including that "Pyongyang confirms its willingness to freeze its nuclear weapons program and resume high-level talks with the United States provided that North Korea allows the IAEA safeguards to remain in place, does not refuel its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, and does not reprocess any spent nuclear fuel."⁶¹

Such statements did not reveal any new terms or concessions. Supporting a light-water reactor was one of the agreements in the second round of talks, while North Korea's nuclear freeze and the continuation of the monitoring activities of IAEA. Verification of "Past Nuclear Issue" was still opaque. However, Carter's visit and meetings achieved significant progress in working towards détente and reconfiguration of the situation. After Carter's press conference, the Clinton administration stopped ceased plans for US military enhancement, and also discontinued additional sanctions against North Korea. The crisis was simply and quickly eliminated.

Carter visited North Korea not as an official, but as an individual, yet the meeting and subsequent agreement between Carter and Kim Il-sung significantly influenced the situation. Carter had been briefed on the U.S. policy by officials from Department of State, and these officials accompanied Carter during his stay in the country.

⁶⁰ David E. Sanger. (1994, June 18). *Carter Visit to North Korea: Whose Trip Was It Really*. Retrieved September 20, 2016, from <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/18/world/carter-visit-to-north-korea-whose-trip-was-it-really.html>, accessed on September 20 2016.

⁶¹ Please refer to the following materials, Arms Control Association. Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>, and also the Asahi Shimbun on June 18, 1994 (Japanese).

It was certainly important point whether or not President Clinton had made decision Carter's visiting by himself; most importantly, the U.S. government could pride itself on searching for resolutions at a non-government level. Robert L. Gallucci, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and his colleagues emphasized in their 2004 book "Going Critical", what would have happened if Carter had not gone to North Korea when he did.⁶² A large-scale military enhancement was about to be deployed to South Korea, and North Korea had threatened war in the event of military actions against them. There were 8,000 nuclear spent fuel rods in Yongbyon, and it was possible that the North had the capacity to process enough plutonium to create five nuclear warheads. The situation thus could have led to all-out war. Not much problem even in the Carter's visiting to North Korea was an individual level since North Korea would freeze the current nuclear development and accept the nuclear inspections by the IAEA.⁶³

As a result, the Clinton administration did not choose coercive methods but turn instead in the direction of a policy of negotiating with North Korea to solve the nuclear crisis. The fact the United States, the only super power or hegemonic state in the post-Cold War era, chose negotiation and dialogue as its response to the North Korean situation is an important element in assessing the subsequent situation on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, it provides an important clue in surveying the new regional order formation after the Cold War.

5.2. Historical Agreement: Beyond the Nonproliferation

As discussed in the previous section, a sequence of events, including the Rodong launching and Carter's visit, led to a quick resolution of the nuclear war crisis on the Korean peninsula.

⁶²On the other hand, as previously mentioned, North Korea has been enduring the U.S. sanctions for over a century, ever since the U.S. government adopted a hostile policy to North Korea in 1950. The North Korean government has managed to deal with the situation through the centralization of power domestic and foreign policy. Please see the follow material for more detail how North Korea had sought not only its survival but also to secure its system from the U.S. influence, to affirm its security, to maintain the Kim Jung-il regime, to unite the people, and to draw the negotiations with the U.S., Nam Chan-sun. (2007). *The D. P. R. K-U. S nuclear negotiations & the Northeast Asian political system : The lessons of the 1990's*. Kyonggi-do, Nanam, pp. 107-122 (Korean).

⁶³ Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, & Robert L. Gallucci. (eds.). (2004). *Going Critical: the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis*. Washington, Brookings Institution, pp. 241-246.

As Gallucci mentioned, the situation might certainly have led to war if Carter had not visited.⁶⁴ In fact, President Clinton stated that the U.S. government was prepared to initiate high level talks with North Korea if they would suspend their nuclear program soon after Carter's visit.

The third round of high-level talks between the U.S. and DPRK in Geneva was scheduled to begin on July 8 1994 since North Korea conducted suspension its nuclear program. Although the third round was postponed for a few days due to the death of the leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, the high level talks were eventually held from August 5 to 12.⁶⁵ After the first meeting in the third round of talks, the two countries announced a joint declaration, most of which would be delivered in the October agreements later. From September 10 to 14, the expert consultation of the U.S. and North Korea, as well as the second-order meeting of the third round of talks, began on September 23. On October 21st 1994, the two sides reached a historic agreement, called the "AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA" (referred to as the Agreed Framework). Its main contents were as follows:

- I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light - water reactor (LWR) power plants.
- II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
- III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
- IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, & Robert L. Gallucci.(eds.). (2004).op. cit. Washington, Brookings Institution, pp.241-246.

⁶⁵ As well as, the atmosphere had gradually changed since Carter's visiting and the Clinton administration decided to drive its foreign policy toward North Korea even though the leader passed away.

⁶⁶International Atomic Energy Agency.*INFCIRC/45*. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1994/infcirc457.pdf>

The Agreed Framework included the shutdown of the pilot Yongbyon nuclear reactor, abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants and the IAEA-monitored canning and sealing of any nuclear spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to make plutonium for a nuclear weapon. For its part, the U.S. promised to provide North Korea with two LWRs, to be constructed in North Korea by 2003.

Indeed, in the Confidential Minute to that Agreement, U.S. agreed to supply 500,000 tons of heavy oil to North Korea annually for the LWRs, as compensation for the abandonment of the construction of running nuclear reactors in the North.⁶⁷ On the other hand, North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness, and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of the reactor would be delivered. Upon completion of the LWR plants, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities.⁶⁸

In the Agreed Framework, the most profound element--especially for North Korea--was the statement of "full normalization" between U.S. and North Korea. While there had been several agreements between the two countries, including statement on cooperation for nonproliferation and dialogues for decreasing the tension, but this was the first time that "full normalization" was promised in a formal and official agreement. In order to confirm the Agreed Framework, North Korea requested that President Clinton issued another official letter signed by him personally.⁶⁹ If the interaction between the U.S. and North Korea had successfully resulted in full normalization, the circumstances in the region would have dramatically changed, in favor of bilateral relationships and regional offer. The US would have lifted all sanctions and opened the North up to normal trade. The status of U.S. troops in South Korea could have been modified, and North-South Korea and North-Japan relationships would also have been transformed.

⁶⁷ United States of America Congressional Record Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress First Session. (1999). 145 (Part12), p. 17027.

⁶⁸ For more detail on the Confidence Minute, please refer to Thomas L. Wilborn. (1995, April 3). *Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement*. Retrieved October 10, 2016, from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub98.pdf>

⁶⁹ On October 21, 1994, both the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, and the U.S. government "hand over a presidential letter of assurance" as well. Please refer to the follow for more detail story, Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci.(eds.). op. cit., pp. 414.

5.3. Meaning of Multilateral Approach

Although the Agreed Framework had not only bilateral but also multilateral implications, North Korea, the North Korean government placed paramount importance on relations with the US: as discussed above, North Korea has historically considered the tension and nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula to have originated above all else from the Korean War and the hostile relationship with the US in particular.

Despite North Korea preference for dealing directly with the US, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established in March 1993 as an international consortium with U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Various other states and international organizations subsequently joined for the implementation of the energy-related parts of the Agreement Framework. Furthermore, the KEDO project would be conducted with a multilateral approach, since the US and South Korea had reached a compromise that the South would take the responsibility for the budget (ultimately two-thirds of it) and type of LWRs as Korean . This meant that the two Koreas had to meet frequently, whether directly or indirectly through KEDO. In addition, when Japan also became a board member, a cooperation frame emerged among the US, Japan, and South Korea. Furthermore, as member countries would increase in the future, the project would become even more complicated.

As John Gerard Ruggie argues, the multilateral approach is supposed to “logically entail an indivisibility among the members of collectivity with respect to the range of behavior in question,” and one of the most important points is “indivisibility” that means not separable into parts. In the case of the KEDO and the Six-Party talks, “indivisibility” was evident insofar as all participants shared the same goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which U.S. had led to this. Ruggie also emphasizes “diffuse reciprocity” and “generalized principles of conduct.”⁷⁰ However, the KEDO project as a multilateral approach was affected by national politics. This statement may be blamed by Neorealist because they consider that that can exclude the national issues in international relations. However, the project had been extremely influenced by liberal thought.

⁷⁰ John Gerard Ruggie. (ed.). (1993). *Multilateralism Matters: the Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*. New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 11-12.

For this reason, the Clinton administration could choose the non-hostile passage and subsequently encouraged South Korea and Japan to mainly participate in the multilateral approach.

By early 1998, the KEDO project had made no substantive progress due the conflicts among the original member countries. Indeed, information about an "underground nuclear facilities" in North Korea emerged in May 1998, though it was still unconfirmed. Pressure on North Korea by U.S. domestic politics and the Clinton administration was further strengthened. Moreover, a joint military exercise Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) centered on the U.S. sometimes had been planned from July, further fueling regional tension.

On August 31, 1998, North Korea fired a Taepodong, also known as Paektusan, passing over Japanese airspace, and some parts of the propellant were dropped into the Pacific Ocean. It goes without saying that neighboring countries were alarmed, but more urgently, the Taepodong was the first time that North Korea demonstrated the ability to attack the American mainland. This was "serious stuff" for both U.S. and its allies with no matter of North Korea to launch a satellite.⁷¹

The Clinton administration was necessarily forced into some sort of intervention. Instead of the sanctions considered at the time of the previous nuclear crisis, the administration began with a "peaceful intervention." The President Clinton instructed William Perry, Defense Secretary, to review the US policy on North Korea up to that point. Perry submitted his research report (the so-called "Perry Report) in October 1999. The Perry Report demonstrated that normalization with North Korea was contingent upon the effectiveness of the framework agreement, and that cooperation with allies, the so-called "double-close method" was included, was a pillar of US policy.

In addition to prompting a reconsideration of US policy in the region, the Taepodong launching provided an opportunity to resolve the cost-sharing problem of the KEDO project, a major cause of conflict since KEDO's establishment three years before.

⁷¹SherylWudunn. (1998,September 1). North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory. Retrieve September 20, 2016, from <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/01/world/north-korea-fires-missile-over-japanese-territory.html>

In November 1998, the KEDO Executive Board reached the following resolution to the cost-sharing problem: South Korea was to bear \$70 of the cost, Japan \$1 billion, and the remainder would be divided by the EU and other relevant countries

The August missile launch was first and foremost a threat to neighboring countries and a provocative act, but ironically, it reinvigorated efforts to establish stability in the region, breathing new life into the KEDO project and stagnant efforts to improve US-North Korean relations.

Yet the new moment of optimism did not last. North Korea became concerned about the increase in South Korea's influence caused through incoming South Korean type. The North Korean government continued to consider negotiations with the U.S. to be the most important element in the KEDO project, and remained resistant to South Korean involvement.⁷² The Clinton government tended to reduce not only the burden but also the deep engagement to improve the relationships with North Korea.⁷³

6. Conclusion

In order to attenuate the tension on the Korean peninsula, multilateral approaches could be used for a practical purpose. In fact, multilateral cooperative frameworks, such as KEDO or the Six-Party talks, have contributed to stabilizing the region. The further development of these efforts, however, remains remote as long as North Korea maintains its priority of negotiate directly with U.S.; North Korea has refused to halt its nuclear and missiles technological development without direct negotiation between U.S. and North Korea keeps carrying out. Moreover, as examined above, North Korea tends to utilize their nuclear and missiles capacity to get through critical situations, for instance, Rodong1 launched in May, 1993 and Teapodong (or Paektusan) did in August, 1998.

⁷² Lee Jung-hoon. (2009). *The Continuing Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula and Its Links with KEDO*. Unpublished dissertation thesis. Waseda University, pp. 123-128(Japanese).

⁷³ It was reported that the Clinton administration, even also the South Korean government, believed that the regime would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed. Please refer to the follows for more detail information, Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, & Rober L. Galluchi.(eds.). op. cit., p. 370, the New York Times on April 14, 1994, the Donga Ilbo on November 28, 1996 (Korean), and please also see, Tsuyoshi Sunohara. (2004). *US-North Korea Conflict: Nuclear Crisis in Decade*. Tokyo, Nikkei Company, p. 223 (Japanese).

The situation in the 2000s has only worsened: North Korea has continued to conduct nuclear explosions and launch missiles, which the international community has devised no way to stop. The U.S. policy shifted briefly with the beginning of the Bush administration in January 2001: in the state of the Union Message to Congress in 2002, President Bush condemned North Korea as one of "axis of evils," and the highly enriched uranium (HEU) emerged as a new issue since October 2002 as well. However, the Bush administration ultimately decided to try a new multilateral approach, the Six-Party talks, after North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003.

Although the Six-Party talks initially led to North Korea's agreement to rejoin the NPT and cease all nuclear activity in 2005, this promise was soon abandoned. In addition, a similar situation repeated in 2007. Meanwhile, the Bush administration embarked on a new policy of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which shifted the focus of the U.S. foreign policy to the Middle East, especially Afghanistan and Iraq. Meantime, the Junichiro Koizumi administration in Japan demonstrate no keen interest in addressing the nuclear crisis or the tension on the Korean Peninsula, except in regards to the issue of Japanese abductions.⁷⁴

In spite of fact that the issues of the first and second nuclear crisis were by no means identical, they shared the same basic elements. The freezing and verification of the activities of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon that were the focus of the first nuclear crisis remain unresolved, and no suspicions of nuclear development plans have been dispelled since the second nuclear crisis. More precisely, there is nothing strange about whenever nuclear crisis occurs again in the future.

Moreover, international community has faced to go through a difficult phase relevant with nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula since North Korea has become a "De Facto" nuclear-weapon states.

⁷⁴ The Japanese government strongly opposed the removing the states sponsor terrorism list when the Bush administration had decided to partial lifting economic sanctions on North Korea and removing the state sponsors of terrorism list in 2008.

“Hawkish Engagement” by Victor D. Cha suggestion,⁷⁵ the Obama administration “Strategic Patience,” or “Military Asymmetry,”⁷⁶ all these policies or explanations might be assumedly adopted toward North Korea. On the other hand, the international community still does not know detail Information about North Korea, especially military information, remains vague. Therefore, the formulation of policies toward North Korea has been extremely difficult.

However, it seems to hardly figure out what a new order the U.S. government has drawn in Northeast Asia after the Cold War, what exact foreign policy the U.S. has to resolve the issue of nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula, and how the U.S. is likely to design the new order with or without North Korea. Furthermore, we can hardly understand what ideas the United States and its alliances have shared to keep peaceful circumstances in the region and to improve the relationships among countries while North Korea has clearly been insisting their needs, for instance, changing the old relations.

⁷⁵Please refer to the follow for detail, Victor D. Cha, & David C. Kang. (2005). *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*. New York, Columbia University Press.

⁷⁶ For instance, military asymmetry has been losing its logic explanation. Duk-Ki Kim, Republic of Korea Navy, says “The North has continuously developed new asymmetric threats that include nuclear and CBR weapons, missiles, LRA, special operations units, cyber weapons, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, Global Positioning System (GPS)-disturbance devices, submarines and minisubs, and online political and psychological warfare”, so this like threat is caused by military asymmetry. Please also refer to the following material, Duk-Ki Kim. (2012). THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA’S COUNTER-ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY: Lessons from ROKS Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island. *Naval War College Review*, 65 (1), p. 57.