

## Armed Violence in Dagestan: the Role of the Caucasus Emirate

Dr. Grazvydas Jasutis<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

---

The article explores the role of the Caucasus emirate in shaping security issues in Dagestan. It focuses on its recent personnel changes and the indicators of violence. The first part of the article methodologically analyzes the concept of violence and pinpoints its indicators - armed attacks, combat deaths, civilians deaths and political-religious assassinations. The second part is concentrated on the structure and functioning of the Caucasus emirate which is hierarchically based. A special attention is given to its military element which operates autonomously at jamaats level. The third part applies the indicators of violence within the case of Dagestan and forecasts the trend of violence. The article is based on primary and secondary sources including the main website of the insurgency in the North Caucasus and the comments received from the regional experts. The article concludes that the structure of the Caucasus emirate remains ramshackle and its military element does not necessarily obey the principles of chain of command undermining its credibility and efficiency. It will imperil temporarily Dagestan however their relative success depends on subjective and objective factors such as ability to ensure the current operational tempo, to generate external support for the insurgency, to communicate with the Chechen Diaspora, to establish unquestionable control over regional emirs which remains the most baffling puzzle.

---

**Keywords:** Caucasus emirate, Dagestan, insurgency, violence

### Introduction

In March 2014 Ali Abu Mukhammad made a speech in a mixture of Arabic and heavily-accented Russian and informed that he would take the responsibility for the Jihad in the Caucasus region and the leader of the Caucasus emirate Doku Umarov had left this world (Kavkaz center, 2014).

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD, Harriman Institute, Columbia University. 420 W 118th St 12th Flr MC 3345 New York, NY 10027, USA. Phone: 929-245-1078, E-mail: [gj2243@columbia.edu](mailto:gj2243@columbia.edu) or [grazvydas.jasutis@gmail.com](mailto:grazvydas.jasutis@gmail.com)

The US Secretary of State has designated Caucasus Emirate under Presidential Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists, terrorist organizations or acts of terrorism (State Department Documents, 2011). The Caucasus emirate griped the world's attention a year ago announcing an obligation to stage attacks against the winter Olympics in Sochi, employing all the means that Allah permits. The message of Mukhammad confirmed the enigmatic death of the former chief of the Caucasus emirate and demonstratively alerted the international community that the terroristic activities mounted by the armed factions of the emirate would not veer off. It added fresh impetus and clarity to the fervent insurgency in the North Caucasus and seriously alerted Dagestan. Newly appointed emir Ali Abu Mukhammad is Avar from Dagestan and his affiliation with Dagestan insurgency and contacts may well contribute to the transfer of insurgency hub from Chechnya to Dagestan with all dire consequences and outcomes.

Dagestan is the most ethnically diverse and challenging part of the North Caucasus which has been engulfed with lurid violence manifested through daily armed attacks, bloody insurgency, ethnic clashes, skirmishes over land and upsurge of wahhabism. It has been heavily suffering from conflicts over land between Chechens and Laks, Chechens and Avars, Kumyks and Avars, Azeris and Lezgins, Kumyks and Dargins. The soviet forced deportations and the return of some ethnicities are still bearing the fruits of hatred and misunderstanding. Dagestan's territorial integrity and political stability has been gravely challenged by ethnic diversity and strong need to accommodate the rights and political privileges of the 30 ethnicities living in the republic. The absence of the dominated ethnicity in Dagestan further complicates the situation and makes the community turbulences inevitable. The diversity within the ethno-political context is well supplemented with great social gap in terms of income, education, employment and living standards. The staunch supporters of the Islamic values and those who adhere to the European way of thinking additionally shake the political-religious scaffolding of the republic.

The context of the above mentioned factors determine and influence the security situation in Dagestan which has been deteriorating constantly and the decision to appoint the first non-Chechen leader of the Caucasus emirate seems to be alerting and challenging message to the Dagestan authorities. The efforts of the Caucasus emirate deserve a special attention because its lethal attacks already turned Dagestan into the most dangerous places in the North Caucasus with the number of 624 killed in 2013.

The scholars have not analyzed the role of the Caucasus emirate in Dagestan in terms of new structural changes, level of violence and incidents, and its impact for security. The Caucasus emirate itself has not attracted much of attention and it remains under-researched object in the security studies. Alexander Knysh (2012) explored how the insurgents of the Caucasus emirate use Islam to unite the diverse and occasionally mutually hostile ethnic groups of the area in the face of Russian domination with the goal of establishing an independent Islamic state based on the Muslim Divine Law. He claimed that the extensive deployment of Arabic–Islamic religious terminology by the Emirate’s spokesmen is meant to accentuate their drastic departure from the secular Russo-centric culture that continues to dominate their societies. Emil Souleimanov (2011) in his article attempted to reveal the specific features of the social environment that generate the diversionary and terrorist activity of the North Caucasian insurgency, in general, and of the Caucasus Emirate, in particular. He identified Islam in its militant interpretation and ethnonationalist separatism as the ideological wellsprings of the resistance movement.

Mark Kramer (2008) analyzed the potential for insurgency in North Caucasus and concluded that official efforts to prevent Islamic groups from engaging in any form of political opposition have achieved short-term success, but surveys and focus groups indicate that the potential for young people to be attracted to radical Islamists remains high. Gordon Hahn (2012) researched the Caucasus emirate and considered it a threat to Russian national security with serious international security implications within the context of global war against jihadism. Sergey Markedonov (2012) extensively analyzed Russia’s policy in the North Caucasus identifying its gaps and problems. Kevin Leahy (2011) researched the insurgency from economic perspective and asked what sort of state might emerge there should Moscow become unwilling – or perhaps unable – to maintain its suzerainty in the region.

The Jamestown Foundation and especially their expert Mairbek Vatchagaev provides analytical insights related to the Caucasus emirate and its role in shaping security in the region. International Crises Groups published a couple of reports of the conflict in the North Caucasus wherein the role of the Caucasus emirate was addressed (International Crisis Group, 2012).

The aim of this article is to study the role of the Caucasus emirate in shaping security issues in Dagestan with a special focus on its recent structural changes and the indicators of violence. The research consists of three parts. The first part deals with methodological issues and violence indicators. It identifies the indicators which will be further used within the context of armed violence. The article extensively use the definition of armed violence which is defined as the intentional use of physical force, threatened or actual, with arms, against oneself, another person, group, community or State that results in loss, injury, death and/or psychosocial harm to an individual or individuals and that can undermine a community's, country's or region's security and development achievements and prospects (UN Secretary General Report, 2009). The second part is focused on the structure and functioning of the Caucasus emirate. The third part applies the indicators of violence within the case of Dagestan and analyzes the trend of violence. The article is based on primary and secondary sources including the main website of the insurgency in the North Caucasus ([www.kavkazcenter.org](http://www.kavkazcenter.org)) and the comments received from regional experts Mairbek Vatchagaev and Emil Souleimanov. The article concludes that the structure of the Caucasus emirate remains ramshackle and its military element does not necessarily obey the principles of chain of command undermining its credibility and efficiency. It will imperil temporally Dagestan however their relative success depends on subjective and objective factors such as ability to ensure the current operational tempo, to generate external support for the insurgency, to communicate with the Chechen Diaspora, to establish unquestionable control over regional emirs which remains the most baffling puzzle.

## **1. The Indicators of the Armed Violence**

Violence attracts the attention of political scientists, psychologists, anthropologists and conflict management practitioners that analyze and assess the concept through various indicators and variables.

It is true that the word 'violence' is, in fact, applied to countless phenomena and is used to describe all sorts of events and behaviors, both individual and collective: delinquency, crime, revolution, mass murder, riots, war, terrorism, and harassment (Wieviorka, 2009). Every conflict involves some extent of violence which makes it bloody and unpredictable. John Galtung (1990) sees violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible.

Following armed conflict, the international community and society tend to focus exclusively on visible violence (its empirical objectivity and factuality), resulting in killing, maiming, deporting and displacing conflict -affected population (Jasutis, Hirose, 2014). The UN Secretary-General defines armed violence as the intentional use of physical force, threatened or actual, with arms, against oneself, another person, group, community or State that results in loss, injury, death and/or psychosocial harm to an individual or individuals and that can undermine a community's, country's or region's security and development achievements and prospects (UN Secretary General report, 2009).

However, Michel Wieviorka (2009) suggests that we recognize the way subjectivity influences how violence is experienced, lived, observed, represented, desired or undergone by individuals, groups and societies/ therefore an objective definition of violence will speak of a violent assault on the physical, intellectual or moral integrity of an individual or group of individuals. The theoretical discussion indicates the complexity of the violence phenomena which methodologically can be addressed through attitudes-behavior-context triangle carved out by John Galtung. The triangle offers to analyze direct violence caused by behavior and structural-institutional and cultural factors. Cultural violence forms and manipulates people's attitudes, values, mentality and feelings, transforming them into hatred, enemy-construction, suspicion, mistrust and direct volatile behavior, while structural violence stems from rigid systems imbued with discrimination, segregation, colonialism, a denial of rights and liberties and the globalization of economies (Jasutis, Hirose, 2014). Both, structural-institutional and cultural violence directly contribute to the direct violence manifested through death, shooting, intimidation, beating and torturing. Namely direct violence is relevant in the research because it assesses the outcomes of the Caucasus emirate activities on the ground related to the use of physical force, threatened or actual, with arms, against oneself, another person, group, community or state that results in loss, injury, death and/or psychosocial harm to an individual or individuals.

The indicators of behavioral violence needed for the analysis can be taken from early warning assessment related to the security. In fact, the most comprehensive database of early warning indicators has been produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which identifies 1260 potential indicators and divides into nine main indicator categories (Walton, 2011).

There are 9 security-related indicators that fit into the armed violence analysis: number of armed clashes, number of raids, other crimes, number of deaths, armed intervention, military build-ups, political assassinations, cross-border shootings, mitigating behaviour (law enforcement) (Walton, 2011). The analysis of the Caucasus emirate is very specific and the applicability of all 9 indicators is not possible. For example, cross border shootings do not happen because the emirate operate in the Russian Federation at a state level though all jamaats conduct operations at regional level and do not cross the boundaries of responsibilities.

The military build-ups are difficult to assess because of absence of the information which could disclose the value of the indicator. To single out armed clashes, armed intervention and number of raids do not necessarily make sense and it is more rationale to cover it under generic indicator "armed attacks" which includes the afore-mentioned indicators. Meanwhile the number of deaths must be expanded to assess combat deaths between governmental forces and insurgents and the number of civilian deaths. The indicator of political assassination remains as is and its relevance is unquestionable. The number of other crimes is complicated as a result of absence of the statistics and the nature of the emirate which is considered as a terroristic organization and its all activities are considered to be beyond the law. There will be no specific attention given to the mitigating behavior (law enforcement) though some initiatives can be mentioned, such as the establishment of the commission of reintegration of former combatants. With this in mind, the analysis will be based on the following indicators: armed attacks, combat casualties, civilian casualties, and political assassinations.


## **2. The Structure and Functioning of the Caucasus Emirate**

Alexander Knysh (2012) claims that the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate is a direct outcome of the two decades of the post-Soviet turmoil in a region that enjoyed neither social stability nor economic prosperity even in its better days, under the heavy but relatively benevolent hand of the Soviet regime. It is pretty new organization based historically and ideologically on the Chechen wars.

On 7 of October 2007 Dokku Umarov resigned from the position of the Chechen president of Ichkeria and declared the creation of the Caucasus Emirate. The main purpose was to establish an independent state under the Sharia in the North Caucasus which was broadened with inclusion of a global jihad.

According to Emil Souleimanov (2011), it was supposed to bring about an Islamic theocracy based on Sharia rule and spread across the territory of the autonomous North Caucasus territories of the Russian Federation.

**Figure No 1: The structure of the Caucasus Emirate**



The Caucasus Emirate is hierarchically structured organization which is divided into 5 regional entities “vilayets” (see the Figure No 1). The vilayets cover the territory of the North Caucasus and includes Dagestan, Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Stavropol District and a part of Krasnodar District. Originally, North Ossetia had been a separate entity within the Caucasus Emirate however in May 2009 it was incorporated into the vilayet of Ingushetia (Kavkaz Uzel, 19 March 2014). The top leader of the emirate is freshly appointed emir Ali Abu Muhammad, who previously held a position of the Sharia Court judge “qadi”. The supreme institution is the Majlis al-Shura (the Supreme Council) that consists of emir, the leaders of vilayets and jamaats.

Each vilayet has a leader the so-called "vali". A part of the emirate structure encompasses autonomous combat formations "jamaats" that operate in the well-defined territorial fragments of the emirate and beyond. The jamaat leaders are appointed by the emir and approved by the Supreme Council (Souleimanov, 2011). Each vilayet is divided into the fronts – the zones of responsibility of local emirs (Tlisova, 2011). The judicial power rests upon the highest Sharia Court that was presided over by the current emir Abu Muhammad. Some sources claim that the Security service within the Caucasus emirate (Mukhabarat) exists and deals with special operations and planning (Kavkaz Uzel, 19 March 2014). The structure had contained an external element "vekalat" which operated abroad and represented the interests of the emirate at international arena however it was dissolved in August 2010 (Kavkaz Uzel, 19 March 2014). S.Stewart and B.Best claimed that the appearance of the Caucasus emirate was clearly related to the need to unify the armed groups operated in the region after the second Chechen war (Geopolitika, 2010).

Once established, it served as an umbrella organization for such armed groups as the Yarmuk Jamaat (Kabardino-Balkaria), Shariat Jamaat (Dagestan), Ingush Jamaat and the martyr brigade Riyadus-Salikhin, known for its suicide bombings (Stanford, 2014). The chain of command within the Emirate is rather unclear, though the appointment of emirs and other top-ranking persons involves the Emir and the Supreme Council. In the provided comments M.Vatchagaev underscored that local emirs obey the orders of the emir who issues the directives. However, the intricate puzzle exists within the field of military operations. According to Emil Souleimanov (2011), within the framework of the individual vilayets, there are active, territorially defined jamaats that are generally self-sufficient with respect to both finances and human resources and enjoy a high degree of autonomy. They represent a territorially fragmented network with a flexible hierarchy and only a few dozen to a few hundred fighters. In other words, the existence of autonomous jamaats make the organization ramshackle and their operations remain individual performance of each jamaat. M.Vatchagaev explained that the leadership in the Caucasus Emirate provides an umbrella to the armed groups in the region and the chain of command works well in terms of spiritual and ideological support. Each jamaat operates autonomously in different territorial fragments and enjoys almost full freedom of military activities and operations. The leaders make decision to organize terroristic acts independently and they do not consult each other. The jamaats act on their own though the contending issues can be referred to the emir for final solution or reconciliation which would not be ignored.



### 3. The Armed Violence in Dagestan


The Caucasus Emirate employs each and any method to achieve its objectives which often result in large number of casualties, fear and havoc within the civilian population. The first attack organized by the Caucasus emirate took place in Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia-Alania) on November 6, 2008. The Riyadus-Salikhin martyr battalion took responsibility for a suicide bomb which led to 14 killed and 43 wounded (Stanford, 2014). Later on, it mounted a number of spectacular attacks against federal employees, officials, politicians, federal forces, imams, supporters of the current regime in the Russian Federation or just civilian population. The area of operations is not limited to the North Caucasus region and some resonance events shedding blood took place even in the heart of the Russian Federation Moscow.

**Table No 1: Major attacks organized by the Caucasus Emirate**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Target-result</b>	<b>Method</b>
June 11, 2008	North Ossetia-Alania	14 killed, 43 wounded	Suicide bombing
June 5, 2009	Dagestan	Dagestan Republic Ministry of	Sniper attack
June 22, 2009	Ingushetia	attack on Ingush President Yevkurov's motorcade in Ingushetia using a car bomb. (1 killed, 1 wounded)	Car bomb
September 1, 2009	Dagestan	(12 killed)	Suicide bombing
November 27, 2009	Nevsky express	Duma member Sergei Tarasov and head of Federal Reserves Agency Boris Yevstratkov, were among the victims. (27 killed, 100 wounded)	Train bomb
March 29, 2010	Moscow metro	(40 killed, 100 wounded)	Bomb
August 28, 2010	Chechnya	(6 killed, 24 wounded)	Armed attack
January 24, 2011	Domodedovo Airport in Moscow	(37 killed, 180 wounded)	Bomb
December 29, 2013	train station in Volgograd and public bus in Volgograd	(34 killed, 85 wounded)	Suicide bombing

Prepared by the author. Source: „Caucasus Emirate“. *Stanford.edu*, (April 2014) // <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/255> , (accessed May 9, 2014)


The table No 1 above does not define Dagestan to be the hottest spot in the North Caucasus in terms of spectacular attacks. However the statistical data and day-to-day armed attacks and interventions staged by the Caucasus emirate have made Dagestan one of the most dangerous places in the region. It goes without saying that the Caucasus Emirate poses a major threat to the stability and security in Dagestan and its impact's dynamics can be measured through assessing four indicators. It includes the number of armed attacks, combat casualties, civilian casualties and political-religious assassinations. The first variable covers the Emirate armed attacks. In 2011-2013 the Caucasus Emirate took responsibility of 679 armed attacks.




Source: "V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2013 godu ubity i raneny 642 cheloveka" (624 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2013). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (28 January 2014); "V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2012 godu ubity i raneny 695 chelovek" (695 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2012). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (16 January 2013) ; "V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2011 godu ubity i raneny 824 cheloveka" (824 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2011). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (5 January 2012)

It was inundated with sniper attacks, bombs, IED, suicide bombing, raids in villages, abductions and other. It is worth noting that the level of armed attacks has significantly increased in 2012-2013 while only 29 attacks took place in 2011. In 2012-2013 the rebels increased operational tempo and imperiled Dagestan society and government.


The number of armed attacks decreased in 2013 and it is rather related to the Russian Federation military activities and increased presence before the Sochi Olympics. The number of the armed attacks correlates with the second and the third indicators which can be considered as direct outcome of the armed attacks conducted in Dagestan. The indicators disclose the number of combat and civilian casualties that sustained Dagestan in 2011-2013. The most volatile year in Dagestan was 2011 which reached a peak with 824 casualties. The lion share of the casualties rested upon the civilian population. The civilian population suffered by 40% of increase, while the number of killed within the governmental forces dropped by 10% though the injured personnel increased by 40%. The drop of casualties was observed in 2012 (by 15,6%) and 2013 (by 8%). In 2012 there was a decrease of casualties within governmental forces by 27% comparing to the results of the previous year and the casualties among the rebels rose by 33,5%. The year 2013 was started with more intensive operational tempo from combat forces (both sides) and it resulted in the significant increase of casualties of civilian population (by 28% killed and by 59% injured) and the decrease of victims between combatants (by 20% of governmental forces and by 26% of insurgents). Different combat tactics and new operations resulted in less combat casualties and increased the number of civilian victims. Doku Umarov frivolously issued a directive to target civilian population and other soft targets. This resulted in 82 killed civilians 124 injured in 2013, while 64 killed and 78 maimed in 2012. One of the most lethal operation took place in Volgograd train station and public bus where two suicides made explosions in December 2013 and killed dozens civilians.





Sources of both schemes: “V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2013 godu ubity i raneny 642 cheloveka” (624 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2013). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (28 January 2014); “V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2012 godu ubity i raneny 695 chelovek” (695 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2012). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (16 January 2013) ; “V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2011 godu ubity i raneny 824 cheloveka” (824 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2011). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (5 January 2012)

The fourth indicator of armed violence is political-religious assassinations that occurred quite often in 2012 and 2013. In 2011 the Caucasus Emirate organized several political assassinations, while it reached 17 in the subsequent years. They targeted the members of administration, governmental officials and even imams. For example, the insurgents killed Garun Kurbanov, head of public relation office of the president of Dagestan media service, Magomed Izudinov, deputy head of administration of Sovetski district, imam Gadzi Aliev, Abdula Aliev, head of retirement fund of Akushinskyi district.



Sources: "Itogovaja svodka Dzhihada v Imarate Kavkaz za 1434 god (2013 g.)" (Summary of Jihad in the Caucasus Emirate in 1434 (2013)). *Kavkazcenter.com*, (9 January 2014); "Itogovaja svodka Dzhihada v Imarate Kavkaz za 1433 god (2012 g.)" (Summary of Jihad in the Caucasus Emirate in 1433 (2012)). *Kavkazcenter.com*, (6 January 2013); "Itogovaja svodka Dzhihada v Imarate Kavkaz za 1432 god (2011 g.)" (Summary of Jihad in the Caucasus Emirate in 1432 (2011)). *Kavkazcenter.com*, (5 January 2012)

All four indicators underscore very complicated security situation in Dagestan and the role of the Caucasus Emirate does contribute to the instability in the region. What is more, Dagestan has become the cornerstone of the insurgency and the recent changes in their political leadership might negatively influence the trend of violence. After the death of Chechen brothers Hussein and Muslim Gakayev and pro-active Kadyrov's approach towards insurgency, Chechnya has ceased to be considered as safe heaven for insurgents and has hampered the possibility to stage massive operations in the near future. The new Chechen emir Khamzat is more preoccupied with his own safety and the Chechens actively participate in the insurgency on Dagestan side (the largest and most active Jamaat Dagestan Chechen Jamaat is Aukh, Khasavyurtovskiy and Babayurtovskiy) (Comments received from Vatchagaev, 2014). The appointment of self-effacing (comparing to his predecessor) new emir from Dagestan reinforces the position of Dagestan in the insurgency scheme and it may have direct impact on the upsurge of armed violence. It is noteworthy to underscore that he was qadi and his military knowledge is rather obsolete.

The drawback raises some serious doubts whether he will manage to earn decent respect from the insurgents and to keep a tight rein on them who might question callow emir. His predecessor Doku Umarov had gone through the first and the second Chechen wars and his combat reputation was unquestionable. In the meantime, the advantage of new emir rests upon his Islamic education, knowledge of Arabic and ability to solve spiritual disputes setting aside mundane affairs. M.Vatchagaev tends to name his Islamic knowledge as the compelling trump because the insurgency badly needs spiritual and moral support. E.Souleimanov considers his appointment as contextual and circumstances driven. Emir had some authority as qadi and the military commanders have recently been killed by governmental forces therefore his appointment was contrivance but not by chance (Comments received from Souleimanov, 2014). Nevertheless, the selection of Abu Muhammad is not the best strategic move by the region's jihadis.

The very fact that picking a successor to Umarov took months strongly indicates there was a serious conflict between the Dagestani and the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaats (Vatchagaev, 2014). The intercepted conversations disclosed that new emir was supposed to be Chechen and emir of Dagestan supported the candidacy of Aslanbek Vadalov and the emirs of Ingushetia and Kabarda supported Khamzat. However Vadalov has been fighting in Dagestan and Khamzat has not showed any sign since October 2013 leaving the position to ex-qadi (Comments received from Vatchagaev, 2014). Originally, the insurgents sought to unify the theretofore isolated regional pockets of anti-Russian, separatist insurgency under the aegis of a transnational and trans-ethnic resistance movement headed by Chechen military commanders (Knysh, 2012). For the time being, the Chechen footprint has decreased though the emirate still subsists on external support and Chechen relations and new emir might have some difficulty to perk up the structure which operates on the basis of Chechen relations.

## **Conclusion**

The article thoroughly studied the role of the Caucasus emirate in the most volatile republic of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus – Dagestan. It assessed the armed violence in Dagestan through armed attacks, combat casualties, civilian casualties and political-religious assassination.

The indicators were explained within the context of recent personnel changes in the Caucasus emirate, its structure and functioning and transfer of operational activities from Chechnya to Dagestan. The article tends to make the following concluding points.

The lurid activities of the Caucasus emirate are directly related to the concept of the armed violence as the intentional use of physical force which undermine Dagestan's security and development achievements and prospects. The analysis of armed violence indicators reduced its number and methodologically offered to focus on the casualties and the armed attacks within the specific context. The specific context involved the structure and functioning of the Caucasus emirate, personnel changes and its impact on operational efficiency.

The structure of the Caucasus emirate tends to reflect relatively a typical governmental administration with the Supreme Council Majlis-al Shura, five regional administrations vilayets, judicial instrument Sharia court and military elements established at jamaats level. Namely, the military element is the most loose and less integrated segment of the Caucasus emirate which structurally undermine the operational activities and efficiency. While the political and religious command might be functioning well and the accountability and division of power exist, the military wing of the emirate operates independently. The existence of the autonomous jamaats make the organization ramshackle and their activities remain less coordinated and less efficient. It partly explains that the Caucasus emirate serves as umbrella for various armed factions, reconciliation mechanism between the insurgency leaders and spiritual Islamic support. However, if this is to be the truth, it contradicts to the basic premises of the establishment of the vaunted Caucasus emirate with great pretension to the full fledged state based on Sharia. In defiance of the ramshackle management and poor military chain of command within the Caucasus emirate, it does not seem its activities and scope will plummet in Dagestan. In 2011-2013 the Caucasus Emirate took responsibility for 679 armed attacks and caused 2143 deaths. It was accompanied with politically and religiously motivated assassinations scattering fear and havoc within the community in Dagestan. All four indicators underscored very complicated security situation in Dagestan and the Caucasus Emirate does contribute to the instability in the region. Moreover, Dagestan has become the cornerstone of insurgency and the recent changes in their political leadership might negatively influence the trend of armed violence.

It seems that the insurgency hub has been transferred from Chechnya to Dagestan due to several factors. The iconic Chechen leaders brothers Hussein and Muslim Gakayev died and the current president of Chechnya R.Kadyrov made doggedly significant efforts to curb the insurgency. The enigmatic appointment of new ethnic Dagestani emir reinforces the position of Dagestan in the insurgency scheme and his contacts and experience with Dagestan may be operationally focused on Dagestan. New emir has no military background and mundane affairs seem to be beyond his competence. Being non-Chechen he might need to reshape and work out new external support schemes and he might need to place an heavy emphasis on Dagestani relations. This will reinforce the idea that the hub of insurgency is being relocated to Dagestan and the republic may face imminent security challenges. Nevertheless, the article concludes that the structure of the Caucasus emirate is ramshackle and its military element does not necessarily obey the principles of chain of command undermining its credibility and efficiency. Temporally the Caucasus emirate will keep challenging the security in Dagestan however their smashing success would depend on subjective and objective factors such as ability to ensure the current operational tempo, to generate external support for the insurgency, to communicate with the Chechen Diaspora, to establish unquestionable control over regional emirs which remains the most baffling puzzle.

## Literature

- “Caucasus Emirate's Sharia Judge, Ali Abu Muhammad, elected as new CE Emir by leaders of CE provinces”. Kavkazcenter.org, (18 March 2014) // <http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2014/03/18/19019.shtml> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- “Caucasus Emirate”. Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (19 March 2014) // <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/158730/> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- „Caucasus Emirate”. Stanford.edu, (April 2014) // <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/255> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- „Caucasus Emirate”. Geopolitika.ru, (16 April 2010) // <http://geopolitika.ru.e2.gfns.net/Articles/952/> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- “Designation of Caucasus Emirate”. State Department Documents (May 26, 2011) // <http://www.hsdl.org> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- Fisher, Simon ed., Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action (Zed Books, 2000).
- Galtung, Johan. “Cultural Violence”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Aug., 1990): 291-305
- Hahn M., Gordon. „The Caucasus emirate jihadists: the security and strategic implications“ in Blank J., Stephen (ed.). Russia's homegrown insurgency: jihad in the North Caucasus. Strategic Studies Institute (2012)



- "Itogovaja svodka Dzhihada v Imarate Kavkaz za 1434 god (2013 g.)" (Summary of Jihad in the Caucasus Emirate in 1434 (2013)). Kavkazcenter.com, (9 January 2014) // <http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2014/01/09/102704.shtml> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- "Itogovaja svodka Dzhihada v Imarate Kavkaz za 1433 god (2012 g.)" (Summary of Jihad in the Caucasus Emirate in 1433 (2012)). Kavkazcenter.com, (6 January 2013) // <http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2013/01/06/95391.shtml> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- "Itogovaja svodka Dzhihada v Imarate Kavkaz za 1432 god (2011 g.)" (Summary of Jihad in the Caucasus Emirate in 1432 (2011)). Kavkazcenter.com, (5 January 2012) // <http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/01/05/87934.shtml> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- Jasutis, Grazvydas, Hirose, Yoko. "Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict". International Journal Stability of Security & Development. (Forthcoming, 2014)
- Kramer, Mark. "Prospects for Islamic Radicalism and Violent Extremism in the North Caucasus and Central Asia". PONARS Eurasia Memo No. 28 (August 2008) // [http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm\\_028.pdf](http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_028.pdf) , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- Knysh, Alexander." Islam and Arabic as the Rhetoric of Insurgency: The Case of the Caucasus Emirate". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, No35, (2012): 315–337, 2012
- Leahy, Kevin. "North Caucasian Rebels' Economic Policy Defined by Conventionality and Wishful Thinking". The Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst (February 2, 2011) // <http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5487> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- Markedonov, Sergey. "The North Caucasus in Russia and Russian in the North Caucasus: state approach and political dynamics in the turbulent region" in Blank J., Stephen (ed.). Russia's homegrown insurgency: jihad in the North Caucasus. Strategic Studies Institute (2012)
- "Promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence". Report of the Secretary General, A/64/228 (5 August 2009).
- "Russia's Dagestan: Conflict Causes". Crisis Group Europe Report N°192, (3 June 2008) // [www.crisisgroup.org/~/.../192\\_russia\\_s\\_dagestan\\_conflict\\_causes.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/.../192_russia_s_dagestan_conflict_causes.pdf) , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- Souleimanov, Emil. "The Caucasus Emirate: Genealogy of an Islamist Insurgency". Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (2011): 155-168.
- „The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (I), Ethnicity and Conflict“. Europe Report N°220, (19 Oct 2012) // <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus.aspx> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- „The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (II), Islam, the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency“. Europe Report N°221, (19 Oct 2012) // <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus.aspx> , (accessed May 9, 2014)

- Tlisova, Fatima. "Imarat Kavkaz i mirovaya revolucija". Golos-ameriki.ru, (28 September 2011) // <http://m.golos-ameriki.ru/a/imar-at-caucasus-2011-09-28-130750883/245968.html> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- "V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2013 godu ubity i raneny 624 cheloveka" (624 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2013). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (28 January 2014) // <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/237341/> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- "V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2012 godu ubity i raneny 695 chelovek" (695 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2012). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (16 January 2013) // <http://southdistrict.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/218698/> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- "V Dagestane v vooruzhennom konflikte v 2011 godu ubity i raneny 824 cheloveka" (824 killed and injured in Dagestan in 2011). Kavkaz-uzel.ru, (5 January 2012) // <http://karachaevo-cherkesia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/198813/> , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- Vatchagaev, Mairbek. „North Caucasus Militants Announce New Leader to Replace Umarov“. North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 15 Issue: 6 (March 21, 2014) // [http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx\\_ttnews\[pointer\]=4&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=42133&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=54&cHash=612a084e01ef25dd450eaefcceb63db9](http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews[pointer]=4&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42133&tx_ttnews[backPid]=54&cHash=612a084e01ef25dd450eaefcceb63db9) , (accessed May 9, 2014)
- Wieviorka, Michel. Violence: A New Approach. SAGE Publications Ltd London. (2009)
- Walton, Oliver. "Helpdesk Research Report: Early Warning Indicators of violent conflict". (22.07.2011) // [www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD777.pdf](http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD777.pdf) , (accessed May 9, 2014)